Civil Procedure by Forrester, William R., Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 49 | Number 2
Developments in the Law, 1987-1988: A Faculty
Symposium
November 1988
Civil Procedure
William R. Forrester Jr.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
William R. Forrester Jr., Civil Procedure, 49 La. L. Rev. (1988)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol49/iss2/5
CIVIL PROCEDURE
William R. Forrester, Jr. *
ACTIONS
Cumulation Of Actions
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 463(3) requires that mul-
tiple actions cumulated in a single proceeding must be "mutually con-
sistent and employ the same form of procedure." The fourth circuit
interpreted this requirement in People of the Living God v. Chantilly
Corp.' and held that an action in tort was improperly cumulated with
a different action for injunctive relief. In finding improper cumulation,
the Chantilly court cited the procedural differences between injunction
and tort actions, such as different delays for answering and for appeal,
different standards for presenting evidence, and the availability of a jury
in the tort suit but not in the injunction suit.
This issue resurfaced in Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy Bank.2
The plaintiffs in Cromwell were investors in a tax shelter partnership.
Each delivered a letter of credit to secure the payment of notes they
had given to the partnership as capital contributions. The partnership
then pledged the letters of credit to European American Bank (EAB)
as loan collateral. The partnership defaulted on the loan, and EAB
attempted to draw on the letters of credit by forwarding drafts to the
issuing banks. Plaintiffs, however, filed suit against the issuing banks,
alleging fraud in the procurement of their investment in the partnership
and seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent the issuing
banks from honoring EAB's drafts.
The trial court granted preliminary injunctions against the banks.
However, after protracted appellate proceedings, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed the trial court, holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled
to the preliminary injunctions.' With the preliminary injunctions lifted,
the issuing banks paid EAB's drafts, rendering moot any further in-
junctive relief against the banks.
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REvraw.
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1. 211 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
2. 514 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
3. Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy Bank, 464 So. 2d 721 (La. 1985).
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Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs amended their pleadings in the
injunction suit. The supplemental and amending petition, which named
EAB and others as defendants, sought damages under securities law in
connection with the investment in the partnership. EAB filed an exception
to the amendment on the basis that the action under securities law,
which sounds in tort, was improperly cumulated with the earlier in-
junction action against the issuing banks. The trial court, relying on
Chantilly's interpretation of article 463(3), 4 granted EAB's exception,
and yet another appeal followed.
However, the third circuit court of appeal found article 463(3) and
Chantilly inapplicable. The court reasoned that "as a practical matter"
there had been no cumulation of actions, since at the time of the
plaintiff's amendment, the issuing bank's payment of the drafts had
rendered the injunction claims moot. "[N]o triable action" remained in
the injunction proceedings, and, hence, the addition of a second action
under the securities laws "was not a cumulation of actions at all." '
The result that the third circuit reached may have been the most
practical solution to the problem presented. However, its ruling implicitly
validates the amending of an injunction action that has reached the
stage of being a dead issue to inject a new action against new defendants.
This ignores the general rule that once an action has reached judgment,
it cannot be resuscitated by the filing of an amendment asserting an
entirely new action; 6 the law requires that a new suit be filed. Though
the court of appeal recognized this issue, it apparently was not reached
because the trial court had not passed upon it.
In the earlier appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court had entered a
judgment vacating the preliminary injunction that had restrained the
issuing banks from paying EAB's drafts. 7 The lifting of the injunctions
allowed the banks to pay the drafts, and once these banks had fulfilled
their obligations under the letters of credit, the injunction suit was no
longer viable. The mere fact that the trial court had not entered a
formal order dismissing the injunction suit before the plaintiffs filed
their amending petition seems to be an irrelevant formality. If the
injunction action was too dead for the new action to be considered
cumulated with it, it was arguably too dead to be susceptible to an
amendment that presents a new cause of action against different de-
fendants.
4. 211 So. 2d 445, 447 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
5. Cromwell, 514 So. 2d at 202.
6. See, e.g., Booth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 So. 2d 703 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985);
Templet v. Johns, 417 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 981 (1982).
7. 464 So. 2d 721 (La. 1985).
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Division of Actions
In Cantrelle Fence and Supply Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' the
Louisiana Supreme Court discussed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 425, which prohibits separate "actions" on a single obligation.
The plaintiffs in Cantrelle, who had been injured in an automobile
accident, filed a suit against their uninsured motorist carrier, Allstate,
and recovered compensatory damages. Following judgment on this claim,
the plaintiffs filed a second suit against Allstate seeking to recover
punitive damages under Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658. Section 658
provides for penalties against an insurer who fails to make payment
within sixty days of the filing of a satisfactory claim "when such failure
is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause." 9 The
plaintiffs claimed that the insurer had violated this provision by unrea-
sonably failing to pay the claim asserted in the first suit. Allstate
defended by arguing that the plaintiffs were attempting to divide a single
obligation in violation of article 425.10
The supreme court rejected the insurer's argument, holding that the
insurer's obligation to perform under the insurance contract was separate
from the insurer's obligation under section 658 to act reasonably in
paying claims. The court began its analysis by noting that "a single
tort may give rise to multiple obligations." Noting that article 425 uses
the term "cause of action" in its caption, the court then discussed the
concept of "cause of action" in an analogous area of law, res judicata.)
The court examined the relation of "cause," under the civil law, to
"cause of action," under the common law. This relationship provides
"a practical guide to determine whether an obligation is divisible," said
the court.' 2 Thus, the court explained:
"Cause is the principle upon which a specific demand is grounded
while cause of action embraces the cause and the demand, and
8. 515 So. 2d 1074 (La. 1987).
9. La. R.S. 22:658 (Supp. 1988).
10. La. Code Civ. P. art. 425:
An obligee cannot divide an obligation due him for the purpose of bringing
separate actions on different portions thereof. If he brings an action to enforce
only a portion of the obligation, and does not amend his pleading to demand
the enforcement of the full obligation, he shall lose his right to enforce the
remaining portion.
11. La. R.S. 13:4231 (Supp. 1988):
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what
was the object of the judgment. The thing demanded must be the same; the
demand must be founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be
between the same parties, and formed by them against each other in the same
quality.
12. Cantrelle, 515 So. 2d at 1078.
19881
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is related to the party making demand." The common law theory
of res judicata precludes relitigation of a "cause of action"
and, whether actually litigated or not, all grounds in support
of the cause of action are merged in the judgment so that
relitigation of the "cause of action" on different grounds is
barred. Under the civilian doctrine, however, because "cause"
is roughly analogous to "theory of recovery" a second suit on
a different "ground" is not precluded. Thus, with minor ex-
ceptions, the common law "might have been pleaded" rule is
inapplicable in Louisiana. 3
Apparently, the court believed that "cause" and "obligation" were
interchangeable terms when interpreting article 425. Hence, if section
658 provided separate "grounds" or a separate "theory of recovery,"
the plaintiff's failure to raise the claim in the suit on the insurance
policy would not impede the second suit based on section 658. The
court held that section 658 was an independent theory of recovery based
on separate grounds, and, therefore, that plaintiffs' second suit was not
barred. 14
Two problems arise from Cantrelle. First, arguably section 658 does
not impose a'separate affirmative duty on an insurer; rather, it merely
supplements the contract between an insurer and insured. Thus, instead
of imposing a legal duty, the statute merely operates as a term of the
contract that defines the sanctions to be imposed upon an insurer when
it breaches. If this is the case, the Cantrelle plaintiffs' ground or theory
of recovery was the same in both suits: the insurer's breach of a
contractual duty. Only the measure of recovery-actual damages in the
first suit versus punitive damages and attorneys' fees in the second-
was different.
Second, even if Cantrelle is correct under existing law, the decision
works against the efficient administration of litigation. The relief sought
by the Cantrelle plaintiffs in the second suit could have been sought in
the first. Although present statutory authority may be silent on the
resolution of this problem, Cantrelle should signal the legislature that
a broader theory of preclusion may be needed to promote the efficient
administration of justice in Louisiana.
13. Id. (quoting Comment, Preclusion Devices in Louisiana: Collateral Estoppel, 35
La. L. Rev. 158, 165 n.41 (1974); citing Dixon, Booksh & Zimmering, Res Judicata in
Louisiana Since Hope v. Madison, 51 Tul. L. Rev. 611, 621 (1977)).
14. In reaching this decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court found it necessary to
overrule Foret v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 391 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980),
insofar as Foret conflicts with Cantrelle. Cantrelle, 515 So. 2d at 1079 n.5.
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WAGE GARNISHMENT
It has long been established practice in Louisiana for an employer-
garnishee to remit funds that have been seized on behalf of a judgment
creditor under a wage garnishment to the parish sheriff's office rather
than directly to the creditor. In fact, many parishes presently use a
form of notice of seizure, which directs the employer-garnishee to send
the seized funds directly to the sheriff's office.' 5 The sheriff's office
forwards the balance of the seized funds to the seizing creditor but only
after deducting its commission and court costs.
Recently, this procedure was successfully challenged in Stevens v.
Lockett. 16 Plaintiffs, who were judgment creditors, commenced a gar-
nishment proceeding against the debtor's employer. The district court
entered a judgment ordering the employer-garnishee to pay the garnished
wages directly to the seizing creditor. The judgment did not require that
the sheriff act as intermediary in the collection of the garnished funds.
The sheriff of Webster Parish filed a rule to amend the judgment
to require the employer-garnishee to pay the seized funds directly to
the sheriff's office, claiming a legal right to have the seized funds turned
over to its office in order that its commission could be collected. The
judgment creditor opposed this position and challenged the sheriff's right
to receive directly and collect a commission on the funds seized through
wage garnishment. The district court amended its judgment to provide
for payment to the sheriff's office.
On appeal, the second circuit correctly noted that under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 33:1428(A)(13)(a)(ii), perfection of the seizure entitles
the sheriff to receive a commission on funds seized. 7 The court ruled,
however, that the original judgment, which required the employer-gar-
nishee to remit the funds directly to the seizing creditor, was correct.
15. In the notice of seizure utilized by the civil sheriff in Orleans Parish, the garnishee
is instructed that "you will hand over to me" the seized property. The civil sheriff's
address is specified and instructions are included for putting the civil docket number on
all checks and correspondence sent to the sheriff.
16. 528 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
17. Id. at 689 n.l. Section 1428(A)(13)(a)(ii) provides in pertinent part:
Sheriffs shall be entitled to no more than the following fees and compensation
of office in all civil matters:
In all cases where the sheriffs have in their possession for execution a writ
of fieri facias, a writ of seizure and sale, or any conservatory or other writ
under which property is or may be seized:
When the plaintiff in writ receives cash, other consideration, or both pursuant
to judgment rendered in suit in which the writ issued without the necessity of
judicial sale . . ..
1988]
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The court stated that under both Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:39231s
and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 241519 a judgment may
direct the employer-garnishee to remit payment of the defendant's gar-
nished wages directly to the seizing creditor. Hence, the second circuit
vacated the amended judgment, requiring payment to the sheriff's office,
and reinstated the original judgment.
While this application of the law appears to be correct, sheriffs will
obviously find it more difficult to calculate and collect commissions.
Remedial legislation may be the solution to this problem.
VENUE
The overall civil venue scheme is enunciated in the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure. The key component of this scheme is article 42,
which lays out the general venue rules. Article 42 provides the most
convenient forum for Louisiana corporations, partnerships, and individ-
ual domiciliaries to be sued. 20 The general article 42 rules are, however,
subject to a number of exceptions, which are strictly construed. 21
In recent years, there has been increasing pressure to modernize this
venue scheme. Many regard the general venue rules of article 42 generally
favoring the convenience of defendants as outdated in view of modern
means of communication and transportation. In addition, the application
of the existing exceptions has been cumbersome, particularly when the
need arose for a single forum in litigation involving multiple defendants.
Some of the exceptions to article 42 have been helpful in this regard.
In particular article 73, which provides a single venue when the defen-
dants are joint or solidary obligors, has helped alleviate venue problems
in complex litigation, but even that article does not provide a single
venue in all cases involving multiple defendants. Given Louisiana's strong
policy of avoiding fragmentary litigation of a single factual controversy
when multiple defendants are involved, 22 most judges and practitioners
18. La. R.S. 13:3923 (Supp. 1988) provides that: "the court shall render judgment
for the monthly, semimonthly, weekly or daily payments to be made to the seizing
creditor." (emphasis added).
19. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2415, which applies generally to gar-
nishments, requires the court to enter an order directing a garnishee to deliver seized
property to the sheriff. However, the article specifically provides that it does not apply
to the garnishment of wages, salaries, or commissions.
20. An action against an individual domiciled in Louisiana shall be brought in his
parish of domicile, an action against a domestic corporation shall be brought in the parish
where its registered office is located, and an action against a domestic partnership shall
be brought where its principal business establishment is located. La. Code Civ. P. art.
42.
21. Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corp. v. Continental Oil, 377 So. 2d 285 (La. 1979).
22. See, e.g., McDonald v. Book, 215 So. 2d 394, 395 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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support the modernization of Louisiana's venue rules. The troublesome
question is whether this task can be successfully accomplished by liberal
judicial interpretations of the existing venue provisions, or if instead
the reform should be undertaken by the legislature.
In the absence of legislative action, the appellate courts have taken
the former view, attempting to solve this problem by applying the
judicially created concept of "ancillary venue." 23 ,This theory allows a
single court to hear an entire case when "venue is proper as to one
claim, the disposition of which will necessarily affect a related second
claim as to which venue might otherwise be proper. '24 These decisions
are justified by the courts on the basis of efficient judicial adminis-
tration. 21
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has not addressed directly
the question of ancillary venue, the court has taken steps toward re-
forming the rigid venue rules. The court's most recent measure in this
liberalization process came in Kellis v. Farber.26 The plaintiff, an Orleans
Parish domiciliary, was involved in an automobile accident in Jefferson
Parish. She filed suit in Orleans Parish against the alleged tortfeasor,
his employer, the tortfeasor's insurer, and her own uninsured motorist
carrier. The alleged tortfeasor and his employer were domiciled in Jef-
ferson Parish and both insurers were foreign. Finding that Jefferson
Parish was the only proper venue for all the defendants, the trial court
ordered the case transferred. The fourth circuit court of appeal denied
supervisory writs, but the Louisiana Supreme Court granted review and
held that Orleans Parish was a proper venue for all the defendants. 27
Under the literal terms of article 42, venue was not proper in Orleans
Parish for any of the defendants. Venue was proper in Orleans Parish
for the plaintiff's uninsured motorist carrier under the exception con-
tained in article 76, which provides for venue at the insured's domicile
in actions against insurers. 2 The problem for the plaintiff was obtaining
23. See, e.g., International Stevedores v. Hanlon, 499 So. 2d 1183, 1187 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1986), writ denied, 501 So. 2d 230 (1987); Thibodeaux v. Hood Enter., 415 So.
2d 530, 531 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Reeves v. Dixie Brick, 403 So. 2d 792, 795 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1981); Klumpp v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 389 So. 2d 457, 464 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1890), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910, 101 S. Ct. 1981 (1981); Tucker v. Tucker, 378
So. 2d 498, 500 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
24. Smith v. Baton Rouge Bank & Trust Co., 286 So. 2d 394, 397 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973).
25. Kellis v. Farber, 523 So. 2d 843, 850 n.2 (La. 1988) (Lemmon, J., concurring).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 848.
28. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 76 specifies venue in actions on life
insurance policies and in actions relating to health and accident insurance. It further
provides that actions on "any other type of insurance policy" may be brought in the
parish where the loss occurred or where the insured is domiciled.
19881
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venue in Orleans Parish against the three remaining defendants. Article
76 offered no help to the plaintiff, for none of the three defendants
was the plaintiff's insurer. Likewise, article 73 apparently did not govern
venue for these three defendants. This article allows a suit against all
solidary or joint obligors in the parish of proper venue "under article
42" for any one of the solidary obligors; in other words, if Orleans
Parish had been the article 42 venue for one of these defendants,
assuming that they were solidarily or jointly liable, article 73 unques-
tionably would have made that parish proper venue for all of them.
Since Orleans Parish was not the article 42 parish for any of these
defendants, the plaintiff apparently could not avail herself of article 73.
The supreme court avoided that result through its construction of
article 73 and the "under article 42" language contained in that article.
The court first accepted the plaintiff's allegation that all of the defen-
dants, including Kellis' uninsured motorist carrier, were solidary. Next,
the court reasoned that article 43 makes article 42 "subject to" all of
the venue exception rules that follow it. Article 42, said the court,
incorporates the exceptions that follow it, including articles 73 and 76.
Hence, if venue could be established in Orleans for anyone of the
solidary obligors "under article 42," or under any of the exceptions
incorporated into article 42, venue was proper for all the solidary obligors
under article 73. Since venue was proper in Orleans Parish against one
of the solidary defendants, the uninsured motorist carrier, the court
reasoned that under article 73 venue was proper in that parish against
all of the defendants.
The problem with the court's analysis, the defendants argued, is
that a literal reading of article 73 suggests that the requisite venue must
be in a parish of proper venue "under article 42"29 for at least one of
the solidary obligors. The plaintiff could establish venue in Orleans for
only one of the defendants, and that venue was under article 76, not
"under article 42" as the language of article 73 seemed to require.
Thus, the court had to confront the argument that it was ignoring the
wording of article 73.
The court responded by applying what it called "proper codal
methodology ' '3° to its reading of article 73. It cited article 5051, which
provides that articles of the Code of Civil Procedure "are to be construed
liberally." Considering this admonition and Louisiana's "total procedural
system," the court ruled that the "exceptions" to article 42 were actually
intended as an "extension, supplement and legal part of the provisions
of article 42."'1 Thus, the language "under article 42" contained in
29. La. Code Civ. P. art. 73.
30. 523 So. 2d at 846.
31. Id.
[Vol. 49
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article 73 could be read as "under article 42 or any of its exceptions."
Justices Cole 2 and Marcus" dissented, arguing that by construing
article 42 to include its own exceptions, the majority had judicially
rewritten the Code of Civil Procedure, and the ill-defined "emerging
theory of venue" was an insufficient justification for this usurpation of
the legislative function. Justice Cole questioned whether the majority's
unprecedented application of article 73 could be justified as serving
either to simplify application of the venue rules or to promote the
convenience to litigants. He predicted that the broad interpretation given
to the venue exceptions would actually increase litigation over venue
because of uncertainty in the application of articles 71 through 85 and
other statutory exceptions. Further, Justice Cole questioned whether
considerations of convenience to the litigants could support the "far-
reaching" majority opinion since the accident occurred in Jefferson
Parish and the only party who had any relationship to Orleans Parish
at all was the plaintiff.3 4
The Kellis court's effort to provide a creative judicial solution to
the problem of inadequate procedural rules for multiparty litigation is
not unique. In Thurman v. Star Electric Supply, Inc. '3 for example,
the court found that the procedure provided for the commencement of
appellate delays after the grant of a partial new trial was unworkable
and a trap for the unwary in multiparty litigation. Accordingly, the
court fashioned a rule that triggered appellate delays based upon a case-
by-case analysis of the severability of the issues raised by the partial
new trial. This rule provided a practical solution to the specific problem
in that case, but it proved difficult to apply in. other situations.3 6 Ul-
timately the legislature, by Act 695 of 1987, amended articles 2087 and
2123 to provide a simplified procedure that required all appellate delays
to be automatically suspended when any post trial motion was filed.
The long-term solution to the Kellis-type of procedural problem
should also rest with the legislature. Exceptions to the general rule found
in article 42 are scattered throughout the Civil Code and the Revised
Statutes, and the means by which the Kellis court attacked the problem
32. Id. at 848 (Cole, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 849 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 848-49 (Cole, J., dissenting). Justice Lemmon joined in the court's opinion
and assigned additional reasons. He saw the problem as one of cumulation of actions
and agreed with the majority's conclusion that venue was proper as to each defendant.
He went on to suggest that even if venue were improper as to some defendants, the
exception of improper venue could be overruled on the basis of the ancillary venue
developed by the lower courts. Since it was not necessary to the decision of the case,
however, he joined in the majority's opinion.
35. 283 So. 2d 212 (La. 1983).
36. See Forrester, Developments in the Law, 1986-1987-Civil Procedure, 48 La. L.
Rev. 233, 243-46 (1987).
1988]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of outmoded venue rules-by wholesale incorporation of these exceptions
into article 42 itself-will undoubtedly cause confusion. When given the
opportunity, the legislature has been responsive to proposals that change
unworkable procedural rules.
JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM
Two recent Louisiana Supreme Court cases illustrate the court's
willingness to extend personal jurisdiction under the amended long arm
statute 7 to the full extent of the due process clauses of both the Louisiana
and the United States Constitutions. These decisions reflect a new method
of evaluating personal jurisdiction. Rather than engaging in a two-step
inquiry of determining first whether the statutory requirements are met
and second whether the assertion of jurisdiction satisfies due process,
the courts now engage in only one inquiry: does the assertion of ju-
risdiction meet the constitutional requirements of due process?3"
In Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp.,39 the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question involving the ap-
plication of Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3201(B) to the Louisiana
Supreme Court. Plaintiff, the purchaser of a helicopter, had filed suit
against several defendants after the helicopter sank in the Gulf of Mexico
(outside Louisiana territorial waters). One of the defendants, the Garrett
Corporation, was a California corporation that had manufactured the
helicopter's flotation devices, which were supposed to prevent such an
occurrence. Garrett objected to the assertion of jurisdiction by the
Louisiana federal district court on the basis that it did not fall within
the terms of section 3201 and thus the statute did not provide for
jurisdiction.
According to the evidence presented, Garrett had transacted other
business in Louisiana, but had never directly supplied the flotation
devices to Louisiana. Furthermore, the accident had occurred outside
Louisiana. On the basis of these findings the district court dismissed
the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. 40
The Fifth Circuit, however, granted writs and found that the due
process requirements of the federal constitution were met;4' but it was
unsure of the proper interpretation of the Louisiana long arm statute
37. La. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1988), as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 418.
38. La. R.S. 13:3201(B) (Supp. 1988), as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 418 now
reads: "In addition to the provisions of subsection A, a court of this state may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the constitution of
this state and of the Constitution of the United States."
39. 513 So. 2d 1188 (La. 1987).
40. Petroleum Helicopters v. Avco Corp., 623 F. Supp. 902, 908 (W.D. La. 1985).
41. Petroleum Helicopters v. Avco Corp., 804 F.2d 1367, 1369-71 (5th Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 49
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because Louisiana appellate court decisions decided shortly before seemed
to narrow the scope of the statute. 42 To determine the proper interpre-
tations, the federal court requested the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme
Court through the certification procedure. 43
Before the Louisiana Supreme Court heard the case, the Louisiana
statute was amended to extend personal jurisdiction to the limits of due
process." Although prior to the amendment the action would have fallen
outside the scope of the statute's enumerated bases for jurisdiction, the
Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the sole inquiry after the change
is "a one-step analysis of the constitutional due process requirements. ' 45
The court then faced the issue of whether the statute should be applied
retroactively:
The general principle of retroactivity is that laws affecting sub-
stantive rights generally do not operate retroactively, while laws
that relate to procedure operate retroactively in the absence of
clear legislative intent to the contrary. Most courts have char-
acterized long-arm statutes as procedural and have concluded
that the enactment of new statutes or the amendment of existing
statutes apply retroactively, at least in the sense that such statutes
may be used to gain jurisdiction over a defendant whose acts
giving rise to the action occurred prior to the effective date of
the statute.
4 6
42. In Adcock v. Surety Research & Inv. Corp., 344 So. 2d 969 (La. 1977), in the
process of finding that due process prohibited the assertion of jurisdiction over the
defendant, the Louisiana Supreme Court said in dicta that the long arm statute "was
designed to allow the courts of this state to exercise the broadest basis of personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents permissible under the fourteenth amendment." 344 So. 2d
at 971. This language, and various repetitions of it, were used by the Fifth Circuit to
interpret the Louisiana statute as reaching to the limits of due process. See Petroleum
Helicopters, 804 F.2d at 1371-72. Two recent appellate court cases, however, had denied
personal jurisdiction on the basis that the allegations did not fall within the statutory
language of what is now Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3201(A). See Robinson v. Vanguard
Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 472 So. 2d 924 (1985); Alba
v. Riviere, 457 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 462 So. 2d 194 (1984).
According to the Fifth Circuit, these cases appeared "irreconcilable with the apparently
clear statements of the Louisiana Supreme Court." Petroleum Helicopters, 804 F.2d at
1372.
43. Petroleum Helicopters v. Avco Corp., 811 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1987). The exact
question certified was, "Was the service of process made on Garrett Corporation in this
case valid under Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3201(1) (West Supp. 1986)?" Id. at 925.
The court, however, disclaimed any intention that the Louisiana Supreme Court confine
its reply to the "precise form or scope of the question certified." Id.
44. 1987 La. Acts No. 418.
45. 513 So. 2d at 1191.
46. Id. at 1192.
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Because the court found that the long arm statute applied retroactively
and agreed with the due process analysis of the facts by the United
States Fifth Circuit, it replied to the certified question by stating that
the service of process in this case was proper. 47
Superior Supply Co. v. Associated Pipe and Supply Co. 48 involved
a dispute between the plaintiff, a Texas corporation headquartered in
Shreveport, Louisiana, and the defendant, a Colorado corporation, over
defective steel casings for oil wells. A representative of the Colorado
defendant had visited plaintiff's Shreveport office on several occasions
to solicit its business. Ultimately, the plaintiff purchased the casings
from the Colorado corporation, placing an order by means of a Louis-
iana-Colorado telephone call. The defendant then shipped the casings
to Texas, where they were used. The lower courts had refused to assert
jurisdiction because they concluded that the cause of action did not
arise from any activity of the defendant in Louisiana, as had been
required in Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3202.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, noting that section 3202
had been repealed and superseded by the same act that amended the
long arm statute.4 9 Emphasizing that the requirement that the cause of
action arise from the conduct enumerated in the statute was no longer
law, the court stated: "Inasmuch as the amended Louisiana Revised
Statutes 13:3201 applies in the present case, the basis of the intermediate
court's decision (which was rendered before the effective date of the
amendment) is no longer valid." 50 The court then undertook a due
process analysis of the facts of the case:
Here, the nonresident was in the business of selling pipe and
related supplies far beyond the borders of Colorado. By sending
its employees to solicit sales in Louisiana and by selling pipe
to Louisiana residents, defendant purposefully directed its busi-
ness activities towards the forum state."
Finding sufficient contacts with Louisiana to survive constitutional mus-
ter, the court held that the Colorado defendant was subject to the
jurisdiction of the Louisiana court.
47. Id.
48. 515 So. 2d 790 (La. 1987).
49. 1987 La. Acts No. 418.
50. 515 So. 2d at 792.
51. Id. at 797.
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